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1. Introduction – aim of the study and methodology 
For centuries Poland has been – and still remains – a net emigration country sending thousands of 
migrants to the United States and Western European countries. Notwithstanding, since the early 1990s, 
along with the socio-economic changes related to the transition from socialist towards market 
economy and liberalization in admission policies Poland started to play a role in the European 
migration system. Already in 1990s Poland hosted various categories of migrants – transit migrants, 
asylum seekers and refugees, petty traders, highly skilled professionals and labour migrants. The most 
important countries of origin were post-Soviet countries (predominantly Ukraine) and Vietnam (as a 
side effect of close cooperation between these two countries in the communist era). The immigration 
grew in importance after the Poland’s accession into the European Union (1st of May 2004), however, 
due to massive outflow of Polish citizens in the post-enlargement period, inflows of foreigners do not 
counterbalance emigration and net migration remains clearly negative. 
China was never an important sending country in case of Poland. Contrary to some other countries 
of the region – particularly Hungary – inflows of immigrants from this country were of marginal 
importance. This situation started to change only recently. The scale of this phenomenon remains 
relatively low but it presents some interesting features. Thus, the aim of this report is twofold: 
− First: to assess in quantitative terms the scale of flows and stocks of Chinese migration to 
Poland. 
− Second: to ask the question whether it is possible to relate recent migration flows to 
investment activities of Chinese companies.  
Due to the almost non-existent Chinese diaspora in Poland we propose three possible ways of 
explaining links between migratory flows and FDI:  
1. Chinese multinationals in Poland recruiting foreign line workers; 
2. Chinese multinationals in Poland employing managerial staff (conditional on local / regional 
labour market conditions); 
3. Endogenous investment process stipulated by Chinese migrants present in the country 
(explicit impact of the diaspora).  
The report will present exemplary cases of those three strategies. 
The report is based on all available data on Chinese migration to Poland. The most important 
sources include: OECD data bases, data provided by Polish Central Statistical Office and Ministry of 
Labour and Social Policy. The analysis of Foreign Direct Investment is based on the OECD data, 
World Bank data and Polish sources (mainly National Bank of Poland). Due to some methodological 
problems (presented in section 3) the full assessment of the phenomena is not possible and the picture 
obtained is obviously biased1
The report is organized in a following way. Section 2 looks at the recent Chinese migration to 
Poland but it presents it in a broader context – of both Chinese migration worldwide and flows / stocks 
of immigrants in Poland. Section 3 provides an analysis of Foreign Direct Investment in Poland, with 
particular emphasis on Chinese capital. Next section is based on available quantitative and qualitative 
data and assesses links between Chinese FDI in Poland and migration flows. In this section we refer to 
three potential explanatory avenues as suggested above. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
. Additionally, the report utilizes information gathered during in-depth 
interviews with representatives of Chinese diaspora in Mazowieckie region. 
 
                                                     
1 Underestimation of the scale of Chinese FDI is due to the fact that unknown part of Chinese FDI to Poland comes via 
gateway countries – see also Zhang 2013.  
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2. Chinese migration to Poland 
In general, Poland is a negligible destination country, both when compared to OECD and with 
reference to EU as a whole. In fact, Poland attracts roughly as many Chinese as Czech Republic, with 
the latter being about four times smaller in terms of population, Figure 1. As opposed to for instance 
Vietnam, the tradition of Chinese migration to Poland has never been prominent, which explains 
relatively lower inflows of Chinese to Poland post the economic transformation as of 1989. A second 
explanation consists of the observation, that Poland is traditionally rather a sending country than a 
receiving one and despite positive economic developments is not perceived as an immigration magnet. 
Consequently, Chinese migration to Poland is economically and politically minor. Because of this 
recent phenomena are even more intriguing.  
Figure 1. Major Chinese destination countries [in thousand migrants], data for 2008.  
 
Source: OECD 
The objective of this section is to present the scale and characteristics of Chinese migration to 
Poland. We first describe Chinese migration in general. We then move to describing migration 
situation of Poland, which is a typical sending country. Finally, we discuss in detail Chinese migration 
to Poland. The analysis of the Chinese migration to Poland comprises the analysis of general inflows 
and inflows of workers (as two separate categories). We also present some evidence relating to 
industry and sector location of Chinese immigrants in Poland. 
2.1. Chinese migration – general overview 
As clearly pointed by Pieke and Speelman (2013) there is a clear structural break in China’s migration 
history. Transcontinental Chinese migration on a massive scale started in the late 19. century and was 
related mainly to the so-called coolie trade (recruitment of indentured workers) and employment of 
coolie workers in labour intensive sectors of American or Asian economies (e.g. sugar cane and cotton 
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plantations)2. The process of mass emigration from China was interrupted when the most important 
receiving countries including USA and Australia introduced anti-immigration laws3
The new wave of Chinese migration started only in the second half of the 20. century along with 
political (and economic) changes in the Peoples’ Republic of China. The initial driver of the new wave 
of Chinese migration was a fundamental relaxation of the emigration policy, particularly, imposing – 
in 1985 – the new immigration law which allowed to travel abroad (relatively) freely and to make 
business with partners abroad (Piłat and Wysieńska 2012; Pieke and Speelman 2013). Chinese 
migration of that time (1970s-1980s) has been relatively ordered both in terms of destinations (USA, 
well established destinations in Europe) as well as regions of origin (Guangdong province, Zhejiang 
province) (Pieke and Speeelman 2013). 
.  
Importantly, these patterns of migration from China changed drastically in the 1990s and 2000s. 
According to many authors, the changes were driven mainly by changes in the Chinese society 
(economic reforms producing both winners and losers)4. As a consequence, previous patterns of 
massive internal migration (“floating population”) could be easily translated into high propensity to 
migrate in international terms. This process was supported by rapid expansion of supporting services 
(migration as a business), growing scale of professional and scientific mobility and expanding role of 
China as source of capital (FDI)5
Today’s China is one of the most migrant sending countries worldwide. According to the estimates 
available the size of Chinese diaspora is as large as 35 million (80 per cent living in other Asian 
countries, 13 per cent in North America) (Zhou 2009; quoted by Piłat and Wysieńska 2012). The 
number of Chinese migrants staying abroad (first generation only) is estimated at 8.3 million (2010) 
i.e. 0.6 per cent of the total population (World Bank 2011). The most important destination countries 
include Hong Kong, US, Japan, Canada, Singapore, Thailand, Australia, the Republic of Korea and 
EU countries (UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain). 
 (Pieke and Speelman 2013; Piłat and Wysieńska 2012). These 
changes were accompanied by a gradual change in immigration policies of the most important 
receiving countries - there is a clear tendency visible to move from strictly exclusivist policies 
introduced in the late 19. and early 20. century towards far more friendly post-war policies 
(particularly in the USA and Canada). Consequently, migration has become a social mobility avenue 
for people of all social backgrounds (Pieke and Speelman 2013; Zhang 2013). 
Figure 2 presents the dynamics of recent 
Chinese migration to main destinations.  
                                                     
2 Altogether several millions of Chinese were sent as indentured workers to more than 40 countries between the 1830’s and 
1940’s (Castles and Miller 2009). 
3 It is important to note that first anti-immigration measures such as Chinese Exclusion Act (USA) or Immigration Restriction 
Act 1901 (Australia) were aimed at this particular immigrant group.  
4 In this respect China may serve as a perfect example of the hypothesis stated by Douglas Massey (1999) that migration is 
not a product of stagnation but it rather results from socio-economic change. 
5 The best example of this kind of mobility is Chinese migration to Africa. According to the data available the number of 
Chinese companies investing in African countries is close to 1000, these companies are often followed by migration streams 
– their size was estimated at 200-300 thousand annually in late 2000s (Politzer 2006; Sautman 2006; Kuang 2008).  
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Figure 2. Legal migrant flows from China to the OECD (total and selected destinations),  
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Source: OECD 
Interestingly, the scale of outflow from China remained high despite the economic crisis and was as 
high as 440-540 thousand annually over the period 2005-2010 (OECD 2011). As the proxy of the 
importance of recent migration from China the scale of remittances may serve – according to the MPI 
data China is the second largest recipient of migrants’ remittances; in 2010 the scale of the transfer 
equalled over 53 billion USD (MPI Data Hub).  
Against this background, Chinese migration to the European destination is highly specific. First, its 
scale is far smaller than in case of other continents. Estimates of the number of Chinese in Europe vary 
significantly. In 2008 it was assessed by Eurostat at 670 thousand (2.1 per cent of total foreign 
population). Chinese sources provide far higher figures: e.g. 2.6-3.2 million in 2010 (Pieke and 
Speelman 2013). Figure 3 presents the main destinations of Chinese migrants and points to relatively 
small importance of European destination countries as compared to traditional migration magnets such 
as the US, Canada, Australia or Asian countries. 
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Figure 3. Ten main destination countries of Chinese emigrants in 2005/06 
 
Source: OECD 
Second, according to Laczko (2003) the structural features of this migration stream are also 
specific being marked by relatively high shares of students, highly educated persons and at the same 
time – irregular workers. The structure of receiving countries is also interesting. According to the 
recent data since 1990s the most dynamic inflow in Europe was noted in Southern European countries 
(particularly Italy and Spain) but also in Central and Eastern European countries (particularly 
Hungary6). The structural features and activities performed by Chinese migrants in European 
destinations differ significantly. In case of the Southern Europe Chinese are very active in the business 
field (services, gourmet industry, gastronomy), in Central and Eastern Europe trade and wholesale 
trade dominates, in case of Western European countries (particularly the United Kingdom) student 
migration plays the most important role7
The presence of Chinese in Central and Eastern Europe was related both to political factors (as 
shown clearly by the Hungarian case) as well as to economic conditions. Chinese migrants were eager 
to set up informal “shuttle trade” and tool advantage of malfunctioning socialist economies. Nyiri 
(2003) pictures a new flow of Chinese entrepreneurial migrants who having no prior connections in 
this part of Europe managed to utilize even brief periods of liberal migration controls. According to 
Nyiri, there were two main factors responsible for increasing scale of Chinese migration to Central and 
Eastern Europe: political and social situation, particularly the Tiananmen Square movement that 
created anxiety among Chinese entrepreneurs regarding the private sector, and the recession that China 
experienced between 1989 and 1991 acting as the main push factor. As a consequence, Hungary 
.  
                                                     
6 Chinese migration to Hungary constitutes a very special case. This is mostly due to very close relations between Hungarian and 
Chinese government in the communist era. In 1988 a bilateral agreement on the visa free regime was signed which led to 
significant increase in number of Chinese migrants in Hungary. According to Nyiri (2003) the scale of border traffic 
increased from 11 thousand in 1990 to almost 30 thousand in 1991. Due to very large scale of the inflow (45 thousand 
between 1989 and 1991) in 1992 the migration policy concerning Chinese citizens was changed, however, this first impulse 
gave a chance for gradual development of Chinese diaspora in Hungary (Nyiri 2003; Piłat and Wysieńska 2012).  
7 E.g. Chinese students are the single most important group among foreign students admitted at British universities. 
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became one of the main distribution centres of Chinese wholesale trade in Central Europe supplying 
most of the neighbouring countries (see also Zhang 2013).  
The scale of irregular migration of Chinese to Europe remains largely unknown. In the early 2000s 
the stock of illegal Chinese migrants staying in Europe was estimated as high as 200 thousand. 
Notwithstanding, some institutions (e.g. European Federation of Chinese Organizations) provide far 
higher figures (roughly 1 million). Experts suggest taking rather conservative stance on this point 
(Laczko 2003).  
2.2. Migration to Poland – general overview8
For centuries Poland has been a traditional country of emigration. This situation started to change only 
in early 1990s when along with socio-economic changes first mass inflows of foreigners appeared. 
Notwithstanding, Poland remains net emigration country whereas the scale of outflow significantly 
outnumbers the scale of immigration. 
 
This statement can be supported by all kind of available statistical data. The basis source of 
information on immigration to Poland is the Central Population Register which provides the 
information on persons who came from abroad and registered for a permanent stay in Poland. The 
problem is, however, that these data comprises both Polish nationals and foreign nationals, i.e. it 
concerns not only immigrants, but also Polish returnees. The scale of registered immigration to Poland 
is very low - in the period 2001-2010 112.8 thousand persons registered in Poland for a permanent 
stay, in 2011 (most recent data) the number of permanent immigrants was around 15.5 thousand 
persons. However, the vast majority arrived from the countries of European Union (72 per cent) which 
leads to an obvious conclusion that this data seem to include information rather about the return 
migration or migration of persons with Polish descent than inflow of foreigners.  
Similar picture refers to the stock of temporary migrants, i.e. persons who arrived from abroad and 
registered for a temporary stay of above 3 months in Poland (both foreigners and Polish nationals). 
According to the Central Population Register in 2011 around 66 thousand persons registered for a 
temporary stay in Poland, whereas 69 per cent of them stayed in the country shorter than 1 year. The 
main countries of previous stay included Ukraine (18.2 thousand, 28 per cent), Germany (8 per cent), 
Belarus (7 per cent), Vietnam (5 per cent), Russian Federation (4 per cent), and China (2.8 thousand, 4 
per cent). 35 per cent of them were staying in the Mazowieckie voivodship. In 2011 42.6 thousand 
residence permits were issued (slight decrease as compared with 2010), structure of immigrants was 
similar as noted above.  
According to the 2011 National Census9
                                                     
8 This section is based on Kaczmarczyk 2013. 
 around 675 thousands of permanent residents of Poland 
(1.8 per cent of the total population) were born abroad. The major countries of origin were persons 
born on the territory of Ukraine (227.5 thousand), followed by Germany, Belarus, and Lithuania. This 
number – relatively high as for Central European standards – says nothing about the actual 
immigration: significant portion of “foreign-born population” constitute persons born outside the 
Polish territory, i.e. Polish citizens born either in the pre-war Poland or abroad, but relocated or 
displaced during the Second World War. In fact, only 7 per cent of foreign-born persons do not hold 
the Polish citizenship. According to the 2011 Census 55.4 thousand (0.1 per cent) were citizens of 
other countries, including 13.4 thousand citizens of Ukraine (24 per cent), 5.2 thousand citizens of 
Germany (9 per cent), 4.2 thousand citizens of Russia (8 per cent), 3.8 thousand citizens of Belarus (7 
per cent), 2.6 thous. citizens of Vietnam (4.7 per cent). Most of foreign citizens live in Mazowieckie 
voivodship (17.2 thousand – 31 per cent of the total). Importantly, the metropolitan region attracted 73 
per cent citizens of Vietnam and approximately 30 per cent of citizens of Ukraine and Russia.  
9 Full outcomes of the Census are not available yet.  
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Similar scale of the stock of immigrants can be estimated on the basis of the Labour Force Survey 
data. As other sources quoted above, the LFS reveals a very low scale of immigration to Poland: in the 
first half of 2011 the number of foreign citizens (aged 15 and over) was as high as around 40-45 
thousand.  
All above presented data shows that the scale of both short term as well as long term immigration 
to Poland is very small or even marginal. It comprises mostly persons originating from former Soviet 
Union countries. Vast majority of all migrants reside in large cities, with around 30-40 per cent of 
them staying in Warsaw or Mazowieckie Voivodship. The trends are very stable.  
Contrary to this picture, there is a steady increase visible regards foreign labour admitted to Poland. 
The number of work permits granted in Poland has been increasing constantly since 2007 and in 2011 
reached around 39.5 thousand (13 per cent more than in the previous year). Additionally, around 1.3 
thousand of work permits granted to foreign sub-contracting companies were issued. The largest 
groups of foreign workers were citizens of Ukraine (35 per cent of the total), China (5,854, 14 per 
cent), Vietnam (6 per cent), Belarus (4 per cent), and Nepal (3 per cent). The main economic sectors of 
foreign employment included construction (22 per cent), retail and wholesale trade (17 per cent), 
household services (11 per cent), manufacturing (10 per cent), professional, scientific and technical 
activities (8 per cent) and hotels and gastronomy (7 per cent). A clear division of foreign workers is 
visible: work permits holders are dominated by qualified workers and workers performing simple jobs, 
employed mostly in retail and wholesale trade (the case of citizens of China, Ukraine, Vietnam), 
manufacturing (the domain of citizens of Ukraine), construction sector (Ukraine and China), transport 
(Belarus) and households (Ukraine). Over half of work permits granted individually in 2011 were 
issued in Mazowieckie region.  
Since 2006 there is a possibility to employ foreigner without a necessity to obtain the work permit. 
According to the so-called simplified procedure the citizens of Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine 
and Russia are allowed to work up to 6 months during twelve consecutive months, on the basis of 
Polish employer’s declaration of intent to employ a foreigner and without work permit. The number of 
employers’ declarations is on steady rise since 2006: it increased from almost 22 thousand in 2007 to 
260 thousand in 2011. 92 per cent of all persons who obtained the declaration were citizens of 
Ukraine. In 2011 the main economic sectors represented by the employers were agriculture and the 
construction sector, followed by manufacturing, household services and transport. The scale of the 
phenomenon shows that significant potential for increase of foreigners’ employment in Poland.  
2.3. Chinese migrants in Poland – flows and stocks 
The aim of the previous section was to provide a general background for the analysis of presence of 
Chinese migrants in Poland. It was necessary to have a clear point of reference when looking at recent 
flows and stocks of Chinese citizens and analysing its structural features – both in terms of general 
patterns of Chinese migration as well as recent immigration to Poland.  
Contrary to other countries of the region (particularly Hungary) Chinese immigrants were hardly 
present in Poland till early 2000s. The scale of the phenomenon started to change only in late 2000s 
According to Piłat and Wysieńska (2012) reasons for such a low interest in Poland as destination 
country were manifold:  
− first, Polish market was not perceived as an attractive one – in terms of the wholesale trade 
of goods imported from Asia it was monopolized by a few businessmen from China, also 
there was a harsh competition from the side of Armenian and Vietnamese immigrants;  
− second, relatively strict migration policy of Poland was perceived as a serious barrier; 
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− third, unfriendly attitude of Polish administration towards Chinese immigrants10
− last but not least – and this is extremely important in the context of this report – as one of 
potential reasons very low level of Chinese FDI in Poland was treated. In late 1990s China 
was ranked 26th among all foreign investors in Poland (see Chapter 3).  
; 
Apart from low or very low scale of the phenomenon in absolute terms it is important to analyse 
its relative importance. The above presented data shows that in 2000 inflow to Poland constituted 
0.14 per cent of the total Chinese migration flows to OECD countries and 0.64 per cent of the 
inflow to the EU countries. Nine years later those figures tripled or quadrupled (to 0.45 per cent and 
2.47 per cent respectively) but still remain very low. Poland as potential destination for Chinese 
migrants is far less important than Germany, France or Southern Europe as well as – relatively 
speaking – other CEE countries.  
Figure 4. Chinese migrants to Poland and Hungary. Source: own elaboration based on  
OECD data 
 
It is believed that EU Enlargement posed a direct impulse for change in previously observed 
migration patterns. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2008) since 2005 gradual increase 
with regard to main entry categories was noted. It refers both to borders crossings, visas, and all kind 
of permits (as well as attempts for illegal border crossing). This tendency is clearly visible while 
analysing the dynamics of Chinese immigration to Poland – see Figure 5. 
                                                     
10 In fact, Chinese immigrants are subject to the same set of rules as other third country nationals. They are obliged to possess 
a visa to enter Poland. However, the number of entries based on the visa procedure does do not cover all Chinese coming 
to Poland. According to the Polish data about 50 per cent of all entries by Chinese into Poland are performed within visa-
free regime. This is possible since about 8 million Chinese possess official passports, issued by 56 governmental 
institutions in China. This category of travellers as well as those possessing diplomatic passports may enter Poland (and 
other EU countries) without the need to possess a visa which makes assessment of the whole story really difficult 
(MSWiA 2008).  
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Figure 5. Inflows of foreigners to Poland – selected immigrant groups. Source: own elaboration 
based on OECD data. 
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Data presented above shows that there is a steady increase in scale of Chinese immigration visible 
since 2006. Since China is gradually becoming the most important migrants’ sending country in Asia, 
so this increase is not a strange phenomenon. However, given that Poland is a country with relatively 
low influx of foreigners, the growth of the number of Chinese migrants to Poland has shifted China to 
being currently (in 2011) the second most important sending country. In fact, China has outnumbered 
India and Vietnam, i.e. traditionally the second most important sending country in case of immigrants 
to Poland. Possible reasons for this change will be discussed in section 3. 
In 2011, 2.8 thousand Chinese citizens registered for temporary stay in Poland. It constituted 0.42 
per cent of all registered immigrants – similar number to registered Vietnamese (0.49 per cent) and 
significantly smaller than in case of Ukrainians (27.6 per cent) (Kaczmarczyk 2013). Only 26 persons 
from China registered for permanent stay in Poland (0.17 per cent of all registered migrants) and this 
number was far lower than in case of immigrants from Vietnam (0.35 per cent) and much lower than 
in case of Ukrainians.11
As for the end of 2011 3,821 Chinese immigrants were holding residence permits and this number 
was much higher than a few years before (e.g. in 2007 it was only 1,095 persons). At the same time an 
increase was noted in number of work permits (see below).  
 
As a consequence, the stock of immigrants from China in Poland remains extremely low. 
According to the PESEL data base, in 2009 the number of registered Chinese immigrants was as high 
as 0.4 thousand or 0.79 per cent of the total. The outcomes of the 2011 National Census have been not 
revealed yet but according to the 2002 National Census the number of Chinese immigrants (foreign-
born) amounted to 0.74 thousand (0.09 per cent) (according to OECD data). All above presented data 
may suggest that inflow from China is of marginal importance for Poland. And it is important to note 
                                                     
11 Available data suggests that the scale of irregular migration from China is relatively low, particularly as compared to 
Vietnamese migrants (Piłat and Wysieńska 2012).  
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that this refers to the country with generally low intakes of foreigners. At the same time, however, 
Chinese immigration is growing in importance and recently outnumbered inflow from Vietnam, one of 
the most important migrants’ sending countries in Polish case.  
2.4. Chinese workers in Poland 
Similar trends refer to mobility of foreign workers. There seems to be a clear division between migrant 
workers originating from neighbouring countries (not to mention persons relying on the simplified 
procedure) and those coming from more remote places, Figure 6.  
Figure 6. Inflows of foreign workers to Poland – selected immigrant groups. 
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Source: own elaboration based on OECD data 
Despite economic slowdown, numbers of migrant workers from nearly all countries increased in 
Poland, but the growth was most pronounced in the case of Ukraine (as the most important country of 
destination). Notwithstanding, since 2007 a clearly rising trend in inflow of Chinese workers is visible, 
Figure 7. The scale of this phenomenon is far lower than inflow of immigrant workers from Ukraine 
but in a last few years Chinese overcame not only Indian immigrants but also migrant workers from 
Vietnam, i.e. one of the most important groups in Poland.  
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Figure 7. Inflows of foreign workers to Poland – selected immigrant groups 
 
Source: own elaboration based on OECD data 
Between 2009 and 2011 Chinese workers constituted around 15-17 per cent of the total inflow as 
compared to 1.5-3.0 per cent in the early 2000s. In 2011 the scale of the inflow from China was over 
twice as high as the inflow of workers from Vietnam. The data presented above may indicate a serious 
change in the migration patterns of Chinese in Poland, particularly if this trend will continue in 2013 
(preliminary data for 2012 shows significantly smaller number of work permits issued to Chinese 
citizens). 
Except for the scale of inflow (in 2005 the number of Chinese immigrants holding work permit was 
as high as 240, in 2011 this number amounted to almost 6 thousand) the structure of work permits 
issued changed as well. Till mid 2000s the vast majority of work permits were issued to managers and 
specialists (over 70 per cent). It reflected both the marginal scale as well as specific forms of inflow in 
that period. In contrary, in 2011 the share of these professions was lower than 20 per cent and majority 
of foreign workers constituted unqualified workers employed mainly in retail and wholesale trade (2.5 
thousand) and construction (1.3 thousand) 12
                                                     
12 There are methodological problems with the data provided by Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policies. Categories 
presented are not necessarily exclusive, additionally, the scale of not qualified permits remains extremely high.  
. 
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Figure 8. Work permits issued (individually) in 2011, by profession. 
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Source: own elaboration based on Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs data 
Figure 8 reveals the change in the structure of Chinese employment patterns since early 2000s (as 
noted above). In 2011 except for managers or specialists relatively important group constituted manual 
(unqualified workers) – share of this category was much higher than in case of theoretically similar 
group, i.e. Vietnamese immigrants. The same holds true in case of sectoral division of immigrant 
labour, Figure 9. 
Figure 9. Work permits issued (individually) in 2011, by sector of economy  
(in per cent of the total).  
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Source: own elaboration based on Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs data 
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Chinese workers are employed predominantly in construction (roughly 20 per cent) and trade 
(around 40 per cent). This structure differs significantly from patterns observed in case of persons 
originating from Vietnam: work permits issued to Vietnamese workers were referring mainly to trade 
(around 60 per cent) and hotels / gastronomy (further 25 per cent). Thus, this data potentially reveals 
quite diverse migration strategies of migrants originating from these two Asian countries. 
At the same time Chinese citizens dominate among foreigners who obtained work permits for 
posted workers, Table 1. In 2011 around 900 such permits (C-type permit) were issued for Chinese 
citizens who constituted as high as 44 per cent of the total (twice as many as for Ukrainian 
immigrants!).  
Table 1. Work permits issued for posted workers, 2011, by type of profession 
Country of origin Total Managers, experts Qualified workers Unqualified workers Other 
In thousands 
Total 2136 280 532 687 637 
China 932 41 51 685 155 
India 129 19 3 0 107 
Ukraine 454 43 316 1 94 
Vietnam 17 0 17 0 0 
 As per cent of the total (for a given country) 
Total  100.00 13.11 24.91 32.16 29.82 
China 100.00 4.40 5.47 73.50 16.63 
India 100.00 14.73 2.33 0.00 82.95 
Ukraine 100.00 9.47 69.60 0.22 20.70 
Vietnam* : : : : : 
* not reported due to low number of observations.  
Source: own elaboration based on Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs data. 
Majority of these workers constituted unqualified workers and this pattern was significantly 
different in comparison with Ukrainian (mainly qualified workers) or Indian (large share of managers / 
specialists) posted workers.  
Differences between main categories of posted workers are clearly visible while analysing data on 
sectoral composition, Figure 10. Contrary to Ukrainian workers who are being posted mainly by firms 
active in industrial sector, Chinese posted workers are predominantly employed in construction 
(around 90 per cent of the total). This tendency is to be related to changing patterns of Chinese 
investments in Poland as well as growing interest of Polish employers in foreign labour from China 
(Piłat and Wysieńska 2012). 
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Figure 10. Work permits issued for posted workers, 2011, by sector of economy. 
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Source: own elaboration based on Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs data 
3. Chinese investments in Poland 
FDI arriving to Central and Eastern Europe played two major roles. On the one hand, foreign strategic 
investors have been important for the privatisation of the state owned enterprises. On the other hand, 
numerous greenfield investment as well as acquisitions of the incumbent private enterprises have 
contributed to changing the market structures as well. The inflow of FDI is widely believed to 
contribute greatly to increasing access to foreign trading networks, facilitate technology transfer and 
spillovers and enable the passing of the so called X-efficiency, i.e. superior management techniques to 
the transition countries. As research demonstrates, however, many of the FDIs have in fact been cherry 
picking, thus having negligible effect on the firm performance (Hagemejer and Tyrowicz, 2011, 
2012). Notwithstanding, access to the foreign trading networks has been an important channel of 
raising the sales and export shares.  
These arguments seem perfectly reasonable if one comprises FDI as flows from Triad countries13
                                                     
13 The so-called Triad is a group of three major trading and investment players in the global scale and includes USA, 
European Union and Japan.  
 
to transition economies of the CEECs. However, flows between CEECs and across transition countries 
are less likely to be motivated by transfer of technology and more probable to be led by scope and 
scale economies. From this perspective, China, being the second largest economy in the world, is not 
particularly interested or well fit for being active in CEECs. This long lasting trend is partly changed, 
however, with the growing interest of the Chinese companies to supply high quality products to the 
markets of the industrialised countries. From this perspective, location in CEECs may be seen as a 
gateway to the EU15 markets. Observing FDI patterns across it seems that many of the Chinese FDI 
entries in the region were governed by either specific interest in that market or because CEECs were 
considered a gateway to EU15 markets. 
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The objective of this section is to describe the foreign direct investment flows to Poland as a 
background for the Chinese investments.  
3.1. FDI flows to Poland – general overview 
Being the largest country in the Central and Eastern Europe, Poland has also consistently attracted 
most of the FDI that came to region since the onset of transition. While both the flows and the stocks 
of FDI have been large in total numbers, Figure 11, in per capita terms countries like Czech Republic 
or Hungary have outpaced Poland over the last two decades, Figure 12. It should also be noted that 
many of FDI projects in the region have benefited from a number of tax redemption instruments 
(including special economic zones) in the 1990s. Accession to the EU as od 2004 made it impossible 
to continue the preferential tax treatment policies, but for a many non-EU firms interested in easy 
access to EU15 markets investment in Poland, Czech Republic or Slovakia consisted of a viable 
business strategy in late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Figure 11. FDI stock in Poland (in $bln and as a share in GDP). 
 
Source: own elaboration of the OECD data. 
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Figure 12. Foreign direct investment, net flows (% of GDP). 
 
Source: own elaboration based on the World Bank data 
In terms of origin, despite temporary trends, these were predominantly Triad countries that invested 
in CEECs, and Poland is not different in this respect. However, tax regulations in Poland until 2009 
have favoured investors from a few countries, i.e. Sweden, Luxembourg, Cyprus and The Netherlands. 
Consequently, majority of non-EU originated FDI coming to Poland has arrived via these three 
countries, making it quantitatively impossible to infer from the official statistics, what is the origin of 
foreign capital coming to Poland. This limits the scope of bilateral analyses to only EU countries (with 
the exception of the above mentioned four). The problem of gateway countries has been identified 
recently in the UNCTAD report on global FDI (UNCTAD, 2013).  
Figure 13. Foreign direct investment in Poland - inflow of capital in 2010. 
 
Source: own elaboration of the National Bank of Poland data 
Given this important legal constraints, numbers concerning the origin of FDI coming to Poland 
should be interpreted with caution. In accumulated terms, major investors are Germany, France and 
Italy, as well as the USA. Nonetheless, gateway countries such as Luxembourg and Netherlands play 
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an important role, accounting for 27 per cent of the accumulated FDI stock. According to the official 
estimates, major investors in Poland consist of Luxembourg, Germany, Italy and Cyprus, Figure 13. 
Whereas Germany and Italy denote actual country of origin, Luxembourg and Cyprus are gateway 
countries, through which FDI from other, non-EU countries came. 
3.2. Chinese investments in Poland  
Official numbers concerning Chinese FDI to Poland amount to as low as €2 mln - €246 mln over the 
past 10 years. These values are extremely low as compared to the total value of Chinese FDI amounted 
to US$366 billion globally and US$24.5 billion in Europe (in 2011) (Zhang 2013). However, they do 
not reflect accurately the extent of engagement of the Chinese companies in Polish economy. In fact, 
just one of the TV factories located in Koszalin (Digital View Inc.) has consisted of investment 
amounting to nearly €34 million in only first year. Nuctech, having established one factory worth €25 
million, planned to open another one, triple the size. Both these investments took place in a year, when 
aggregate FDI inflow to Poland from China amounted to €19 million. This suggests that the extent of 
using the gateway countries may be considerable in the case of Chinese FDI to Poland. 
With reference to the industry composition, the FDI inflows of 2010 identifiable to China consist 
mostly of computers and electronics (27.5 per cent of total Chinese FDI to Poland) and trade (21.8 per 
cent of total Chinese FDI to Poland). These two sections dominated also in 2011 amounting to 48.6 
per cent and 26.9 per cent of total Chinese FDI to Poland, respectively14
4. Does diaspora matter? Chinese migration and FDI flows 
. It should be noted, however, 
that these numbers may be misleading, as an unknown part of Chinese FDI to Poland comes via 
gateway countries. This observation is clearly consistent with analysis of Zhang (2013) who pointed 
that Luxembourg is the most important host country for Chinese FDI in Europe (around 37 per cent of 
the total European FDI) while hosting only 0.01 per cent of Chinese migrants. 
The picture presented in previous section proves that analysis of links between Chinese diaspora and 
FDI flows to Poland needs to be conditional on the specific position of Chinese migrants in the 
country, particularly on the fact that Chinese diaspora is hardly existent. Thus, what might make sense 
in the Polish context is to look rather at the impacts (or potential impacts) of capital flows on 
migration process than vice versa. Following this line of reasoning, next two short sections discuss 
potential impacts of Chinese FDI on inflows of both unskilled and highly skilled migrants from China. 
The last one focuses on a clear case of endogenous investments undertaken by members of Chinese 
community in Poland.  
4.1. Chinese FDI as a driver of mass migration 
Answer to the question whether Chinese FDI can lead to a massive inflow of Chinese workers is highly 
conditional on the labour market conditions in Poland. The point is that while the de nomine difference 
in wages in Poland when compared to China is considerable, manual workers compensations usually do 
not exceed substantially a minimum wage level. Minimum wage legislation is relatively strictly enforced 
in Poland, which implies that any investor willing to lower employment costs by seeking cheaper labour 
force from its country of origin would need to comply with this requirement. Furthermore, legislation 
requires the employer to prove that adequate Polish workers are not available before the work permits for 
the foreigners are granted. While this legislation is not strongly enforced, majority of larger scale 
investment projects involve the engagement of the local authorities, who are interested in creating jobs 
                                                     
14 Data courtesy of the National Bank of Poland. 
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for their constituency. Consequently, there is a variety of stakeholders able to use formal constraints on 
employing foreign manual workers accompanying the FDIs.  
Moreover, wages are still relatively low in Poland, when compared to the Western Europe. 
Majority of FDIs locating in CEECs establish their production sites to lower the transportation costs to 
the European Union. In the case of Poland relatively large size of the internal market is an additional 
driver. Business wise, employing local workers offers a sufficient cost advantage. Thus in most cases 
linking FDI activity with importing of foreign labour seems not to be the most efficient strategy. 
Finally, depending on a sector, local workers may actually be more able than expats. COVEC 
constitutes one such example. COVEC (China National Overseas Engineering Corporation) is one of 
the largest Chinese companies operating in construction sector (world’s third largest). It is a member 
enterprise of China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC) – large scale construction company 
operating under the supervision of Chinese government. Observing large scale public infrastructure 
investment projects undertaken by the Polish government, COVEC has participated in a tender for 
road construction (two sections of the A2 highway for a cost of US$450 million15). Having won the 
contract (in 2009), COVEC has realised that with the intensifying public investment, the 
subcontractors and suppliers are not able to satisfy the demand for services and raw materials16
In purely speculative terms it is possible that positive example of COVEC might have impacted 
positively attitudes towards large-scale Chinese investments and also foster import of Chinese 
workers. On the contrary, COVEC’s failure significantly impacted public perception of Chinese 
business activities in Poland. 
. These 
problems were common to all investors at that time, but local engineers and logistic specialists were 
able to at least partially by-pass the physical constraints. It seems that the COVEC’s strategy was to 
employ local subcontractors and offer them far lower rates than the market ones. This strategy turned 
into complete failure. Under the circumstances COVEC, which largely relied on Chinese specialists, 
was unable to fulfil the contract and had to abandon the project, without settling with the 
subcontractors. In early May 2011 most of the Chinese workers did not return to work and machinery 
operations were suspended. A few weeks later COVEC suggested a new price around 70 per cent 
higher than the original bidding price but this was rejected by Polish government (and the whole issue 
ended in court).  
4.2. Chinese FDI as a driver of highly skilled and managerial mobility 
According to Piłat and Wysieńska (2012) spatial concentration of Chinese migrants in Poland is 
strictly correlated with Chinese FDI. Report presented by KMPG in 2011 (KMPG 2011) suggests that 
Chinese investments are concentrated in several Polish locations and those locations are becoming 
migration magnets for Chinese people. Obviously, large share of them constitute highly skilled 
migrants – managers and professionals, see section 3.4.  
                                                     
15 Importantly, price proposed was about half the costs estimated by the Polish government.  
16 Reports by the govenrment and by the industry representatives suggest, that the whole sector had problems in accessing 
concrete, asphalt, drainage channels,etc. Imports were infeasible, because the ability of the transport companies to 
relocate such heavy and voluminous cargo were already exhausted. 
Chinese Investment Strategies and Migration – Does Diaspora Matter? Poland – Case Study 
MPC-RR No.2013/10 © 2013 EUI, RSCAS 19 
Figure 14. Chinese investment in Poland. 
 
Source: KPMG 2011 
However, due to data limitations – as shown in previous section – this hypothesis cannot be 
verified empirically. From the data presented in section 3.4 it follows that share of managers among 
Chinese labour migrants is twice as high as compared with Vietnamese (and much higher than in case 
of Ukrainian workers), Figure 8. At the same time there is a clear structural pattern visible with large 
numbers of Chinese workers employed in construction and industry. Nonetheless, there is no empirical 
evidence linking these patterns to investment activities of Chinese companies. 
Another explanation for this phenomenon is related to the highly skilled migrants from China. 
Many investors prefer to delegate managerial and specialists positions to expats and Chinese FDI does 
not differ in this respect. However, majority of Chinese FDI occurs in relatively capital intensive 
industries, where the production workers require only small “human” supervision and management. 
For example, due to automatisation a production line staffed mostly with Polish manual workers may 
require one manager at each shift. Production levels as well as more strategic decisions are taken at the 
HQ of the FDI sending company. So is research and design as well as financial management. This 
lowers substantially the scope for demand for the Chinese managers and experts.  
On the other hand, the very fact that the Chinese diaspora is present in Poland generates need for 
ethnic services, which in the future may reinforce the originally minuscule effect (see next section).  
4.3. Chinese investments as an endogenous process 
Main aim of this section is to assess one particular case of Chinese investment activity in Poland 
which is strictly related to migration process and, in our opinion, may serve as an example of 
endogenous investment process conditional on presence of Chinese community. Parallel we will 
attempt to compare two important Asian communities in Poland: Chinese and Vietnamese immigrants. 
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As noted above, regarding the immigration from Asia, Vietnamese constitute the largest and the 
most visible migrant community in Poland. The history of their presence is longer and far richer than 
in the case of Chinese immigrants, who are definitely less numerous in Poland. Interestingly, 
migration researchers tend to compare Vietnamese community not with other Asian groups17
Although Vietnamese in Poland are treated as the best organized migrant community, which is 
visible through many formal and informal associations and organizations in these community (Piłat 
and Wysieńska 2012), Vietnamese seem to be acting more independently then the Chinese. However, 
this is rather the Chinese community which is more scattered in Poland. Chinese investments in 
Poland cover not only the trading centres, restaurants or ethnic services, like in case of Vietnamese, 
but also many other sectors. The advantage of Chinese in Poland, in economic terms, depends mostly 
on the size of investments and international business contacts. This feature is extremely important due 
to the fact that far more numerous Vietnamese communities in Poland became dependant on the 
Chinese, at least in the sector that is occupied by the majority of Vietnamese immigrants in Poland, 
namely trade in imported goods from Asia.  
 but with 
the Ukrainian one. This kind of comparison was marked by significant differences: different patterns 
of integration (in every dimension), different opportunity structure stemming from legal rules 
(privileges for Ukrainian nationals), different language and cultural distance influencing the potential 
for integration and, last but not least, different patterns of mobility (e.g. Grzymała-Kazłowska 2008). 
It could be assumed that fewer differences would be observed when comparing Vietnamese with 
Chinese migrants in Poland. With regard to sectors of activity Chinese, similarly to Vietnamese, are 
involved in trade and catering. However, Chinese's involvement in Polish economy is not limited to 
these two sectors, as it is (to a large extent) in the case of Vietnamese. Chinese are also significantly 
present in other sectors of economy (see section 3).  
Migration and adaptation patterns of immigrants from Vietnam and China differ as well. 
Although both communities are strongly based on the collectivistic attitude, respect for elderly 
people, specific perception of the family, attachment to home country, mother tongue and culture, 
readiness to support families and co-ethnics, their functioning in Poland shows that there are many 
differences in how they find themselves in the receiving societies and how their relationships with 
others look like. Chinese, as those coming from the "Middle State"18
Both similarities and differences are particularly well identifiable in such places that concentrate 
migrants from both ethnic groups. One of the most known cases of such concentration is the huge 
trading centre, or to be more precise - wholesale market, in Wólka Kosowska near Warsaw
 seem to treat others in a way 
that emphasizes their superiority. This does not allow them to establish close relationships with the 
representatives of either receiving society or, for instance, the Vietnamese community. Next, the 
majority of Chinese migrants in Poland are temporary migrants and it differs significantly from 
migration patterns of Vietnamese who declare to be in Poland only temporary, while establishing 
more and more ties to Poland and becoming settled migrants.  
19
                                                     
17 Other than Chinese or Vietnamese groups are subject of the study on Turkish, Pakistani, Armenian and Indian migrants in 
Poland, conducted by the Institute of Public Affairs in 2012-1013, see: 
. It 
concentrates mostly Chinese and Vietnamese entrepreneurs, but also Polish, Turkish and Indian ones. 
http://www.isp.org.pl/ygiel-kulturowy-czy-getta-
narodowosciowe-wzory-integracji-i-wzajemne-relacje-imigrantow-z-azji-i-bli,688.html, accessed on 14 May 2013).  
18 Although the tradition of treating others as Barbarians is much weaker, still treating Chine as the centre of the world 
determines the mentality of both non-migrants and emigrants from China, including those who came to Poland. See 
Tomala 2001. 
19 Information regarding Chinese migrants functioning within the trading centres in Wólka Kosowska are based on the results 
of the study focused on migrants' economic institutions and their influence on the local community as a part of a wider 
project titled "Różni, ale równi - badania nad równym traktowaniem migrantów w Polsce" ("Different, but equal - the 
study on treatment of migrants in Poland"), conducted by Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej (Association for Legal 
Intervention) and Instytut Spraw Publicznych (Institute of Public Affais) in 2012. For more information about the study 
and main results refer to Klorek and Szulecka 2013.  
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The fact that large numbers of representatives of several national groups meet there does not mean that 
there is interethnic communication that would relate to other things than the business issues. National 
groups, including Chinese, limit their social contacts to co-ethnics. Although in Poland there are many 
other places that concentrate lower numbers of Chinese traders (e.g. in Jaworzno, where only Chinese 
entrepreneurs act next to less numerous Polish traders), the trading centre in the village being the 
suburbs of Warsaw, in Wólka Kosowska, constitutes a perfect place to be studied in several contexts 
regarding Chinese diaspora, including types of economic activity, interethnic relations, relations with 
local authorities, motivation to learn Polish legal, economic and social norms, culture, language, and 
the role played in the wholesale market offering imported goods from Asia. The situation observed in 
Wólka Kosowska may reveal many features of Chinese migration to Poland in general and its linkages 
to investment activities. 
Wólka Kosowska is a small village situated about 30 kilometers from the centre of Warsaw. In the 
2000s it became famous not only in Poland, but also in the CEE region because of the establishment of 
large trading centre. The first market halls were built by the Chinese investors (GD Poland company) 
in mid 1990s. Other halls were built few years later, at the beginning of the 2000s, by other foreign 
investors, mainly Vietnamese and Turkish immigrants. Although currently, the complex of market 
halls is owned by several national groups, these are the Chinese who established the trading centre and 
still have significant shares in it, ruling the conditions of trading space for rent or offering goods to be 
sold in wholesale or retail trade. Interestingly, already in mid-1990s Chinese businessmen chose the 
agricultural area near Warsaw to build there large market halls, supposed to serve mainly wholesale 
purposes and to become the centre of wholesale trade of goods imported from Asia (mainly from 
China) in the region. And their vision of the future of this locality in Wolka Kosowska is claimed to be 
very accurate, which according to some businessmen from the trading centre in Wólka Kosowska is 
not surprising, since Chinese are treated as those who carefully study the conditions for possible 
investments and very rarely make mistakes20
As it was already indicated, representatives of other migrant communities (especially the 
Vietnamese one) perceive the Chinese' choices as a guarantee of success and often follow them in 
business terms. Moreover, these are the Chinese who have the best contacts and opportunity to import 
directly from China, which facilitates their trading activity and causes that other migrant traders 
become dependent on them. Thus, in practice Chinese may dictate terms and conditions of 
cooperation. And this is mainly due to direct contacts in China and knowledge about the 
manufacturing process there. Their position in the trading centre in Wólka Kosowska seems to be 
more advantageous than the position of other migrants. This also causes that the Chinese investments 
in trade attract other Chinese investors or workers, not only those interested in wholesale, but also 
those who plan to operate in other sectors, e.g. in real estate. However, admission policy, in particular 
obtaining visas, sometimes occurs to constitute a significant barrier on the way to Poland, where other 
Chinese migrants already reside (often temporarily) and do their business or work in Poland. 
Nevertheless, still Chinese migrants own large part of the whole market in Wólka Kosowska, which 
means that hiring trading boxes is also ruled and valued by them. In business relation they are not 
focused on cooperation with co-ethnics only. They offer their services and trading space for rental to 
anyone who can afford to run one's own trading company in Wólka Kosowska.  
. In the early 2000s Vietnamese and Turkish investors, 
following the Chinese investment, found this locality as perfect for further business development. The 
appearance of other foreign investments in Wólka Kosowska was to some extent linked to the more 
and more real perspective of closing the main open-air market located in the area of the 10th 
Anniversary Stadium in the centre of Warsaw (‘Jarmark Europa’), which for several years constituted 
the place of work for many migrant salespeople, starting from small retail traders to very influential 
businessmen, owning various businesses often linked to both trade and catering.  
                                                     
20 Opinion provided by Vietnamese entrepreneur functioning in Wólka Kosowska for over a dozen years now.  
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The main Chinese investment in Wólka Kosowska is the "GD Poland Investments Ltd", often 
called Chinese Trade Center. It is presented by the company, as "the largest distribution location of 
goods and merchandises from China and entire Asia and it is at the same time the greatest Chinese 
investment in the region. The investment reached over 50 million USD and is situated on 200 
thousands sq. meter yard" 21. The centre consists of 6 trading buildings, 3 warehouses and a hotel for 
people renting trading boxes in the centre or clients coming from distant places. The premises of the 
centre serve not only trading purposes. There are many additional services available in GD centre, 
namely bank office, exchange offices, restaurants, grocery shops, legal and tax advisory offices, post 
office. In general the offer of the sellers (mostly wholesale traders) in the GD halls includes clothes, 
shoes, accessories, small electronics and AGD appliances, fancy goods (also original Asian food is 
available in the centre). To emphasise the role and significance of this investment, the GD company 
presents the trading centre as "beyond competition in this craft", stating that the centre "is visited by 
the customers from all over Poland and neighboring countries as well. Networks of hypermarkets like 
Auchan, Geant and Carrefour also do some shopping here"22
In the qualitative study (Klorek and Szulecka 2013) it was confirmed that the fact that many 
Chinese run their businesses or work as hired employees in the trading centre cause that specific 
services, targeted at the Chinese, became available in the surroundings. For instance, Chinese enjoy 
gambling: they play cards, use slot machines or visit casinos. One of the Warsaw’s casinos is located 
in Janki, on the way from Warsaw to Wólka Kosowska, and part of its personnel constitute Chinese. It 
is possible to have the driving lessons in Chinese in the neighbourhood of Wólka Kosowska. Chinese 
may me also provided with translation services, although the demand for them seems to be bigger than 
the current supply. Importantly, many services advertised in the area of the trading centre are 
presented also in Chinese. This shows that the presence of Chinese contributed to the development of 
services that are aimed at satisfying not only social needs (restaurants, casinos), but also needs that 
will improve the conditions of daily routines, such as work, commuting, taking care of children and 
housekeeping. Thus we have to do with a very interesting case: the first impulse was given by Chinese 
investment, at the moment the presence of growing Chinese community attract investors from China 
and from other countries. The impact of diaspora is clear in this case. 
. In this way, the Chinese investors try to 
dispel the myth that hypermarkets are threats for such trading centres, at the same time inviting people 
to shop in Wólka Kosowska, which will be cheaper than shopping in the hypermarkets. Nevertheless, 
the character of the GD trading centre in Wólka Kosowska is based on wholesale, which means the 
centre is not a real alternative for retail buyers. For such people Chinese have another offer: numerous 
small Chinese markets in many Polish towns and even villages, especially in the regions considered as 
less wealthy (Eastern and Southern part of the country).  
In the area of Wólka Kosowska, Chinese invested not only in the trading halls. They also built 
luxury housing, which constitutes now the place of living for those well-to-do immigrants. To some 
extent buying a house in such area could be seen as a form of another investment, since it happens that 
part of the houses or other premises (e.g. a garage) are used to accommodate co-ethnics who are 
newcomers and have to start their living in Poland being dependant on those who are wealthier and 
more familiar with the economic reality in Poland. Such practices constitute a kind of an incentive for 
the newcomers, who would not decide to come to a foreign country if they were not convinced that 
they would get support from co-ethnics.  
In terms of adaptation / integration Chinese are rather distanced towards the receiving society and 
other immigrant communities. The relations established by Chinese immigrants in Wólka Kosowska 
are mostly based on economic ties, and these are usually Chinese who rule these contacts due to their 
better access to goods produced in China. The relations with another Asian community, namely 
Vietnamese who are claimed to be still more numerous than the Chinese in Wólka Kosowska, are 
                                                     
21 The website of the GD company: http://www.gdpoland.pl/en/onas.php (accessed on 20.02.2013) 
22 The website of the GD company: http://www.gdpoland.pl/index.php (accessed on 20.02.2013). 
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perceived as strained. Although with regard to business matters, they have to communicate with each 
other, even if they are not interested in establishing more social contacts. It happens, however, that in 
order to maintain positive business relations, Chinese and Vietnamese invite each other to social 
events, such as wedding or special dinners for business partners. It is of note that this is often basic 
Polish which constitutes the language of their communication. In general, however, Chinese are not 
eager to learn Polish. They treat this country or even this specific place as only temporary place of 
residence, which will change immediately if staying in this concrete location becomes no more 
profitable. In that sense, Chinese are claimed to be very mobile, not focused on establishing stronger 
ties with the receiving community. As representatives of the receiving society claim, Chinese are 
convinced that their tongue should be learnt by others rather than they should learn the language of the 
receiving society.  
Often, Chinese are seen as people who express their superiority in various aspects of life. For 
instance, this refers to mixed marriages or sending children to schools. Importantly, those Chinese 
immigrants who can afford this, send their children to American or British schools in Poland, which 
causes that still there are no opportunities for the children to learn Polish language. However, on the 
level of relations between those who have a kind of power and influence (e.g. owners of GD company 
and local government) the situations looks differently. Chinese investors show their interest in 
improving various aspects of the local area, and even invest in local infrastructure. According to 
information acquired in the course of qualitative studies (Klorek and Szulecka 2013) Chinese 
community concentrated in the suburbs of Warsaw, comprises mostly economic migrants, single 
persons, without families. However, there are exceptions: mixed marriages and families with small 
children. Recently, a new multicultural kindergarten (called Panda) was opened in the area, and from 
the very beginning it was planned for Chinese and Vietnamese children23
Importantly, Chinese investments in trade in Poland are sometimes associated with an enormous 
threat to local economy and tax interests. Chinese are blamed of bankruptcy of small Polish 
entrepreneurs, "flooding" the market with cheap and low-quality goods produced in Asia. The way 
they operate in such places as trading centre in Wólka Kosowska, is associated with the informal 
economy and frauds. The sight of luxury goods (cars, mobile phones) possessed by Chinese migrants, 
even by "ordinary sellers" provoke negative comments among the members of the receiving society, 
who consider the way they acquire their capital as nit fully honest. Although significant extent of 
informal operations may be probably observed in the economic activity of many Chinese migrants, it 
should be also emphasised that perceptions of Chinese migrants does not often involve any reflections 
referring to Asian culture, in which, for instance, the economic status is shown through such attributes 
as luxury goods (vehicles, clothing, communication devices) and business is based on many informal 
arrangements and negotiations (see, e.g., Klorek and Szulecka 2013, Żabowska 2012). 
.  
In terms of migration strategies Chinese do not treat Poland as an attractive destination country. 
Rather, they plan to return to China as soon as they accumulate satisfactory capital in Poland (or in 
any other country of the EU) (Klorek and Szulecka 2013). Additionally, opposite to Vietnamese, their 
declarations about return are more likely to become reality. The fact that Chinese parents send their 
children to British or American schools in Poland or to study abroad also shows that this is not the 
return to China, which is the main aim of immigrants who are currently in Poland. The choice is 
however the "luxury" of those who can afford to be independent and have stable sources of income to 
support themselves and their families, often being still in the home country. Individual strategies of 
less wealthy Chinese migrants differ significantly from the strategies of more influential investors. 
Despite the crisis, businessmen still have plans how to occupy next positions in the market of 
                                                     
23 Although the owners expected that foreigners would be more interested in sending children to this educational unit, the effects 
were not much satisfactory at the beginning. Nonetheless, the owners still see the Chinese as the main immigrant community 
in Wólka Kosowska and even consider learning Chinese themselves, treating this as prospective investment. On the contrary, 
as it was mentioned earlier, Chinese in Poland do not see the need to invest time and money to learn Polish. 
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wholesale and retail trade. Some Chinese see that consumers appreciate low prices offered in the 
Chinese markets, appearing in more and more locations in Poland, and respond to this accordingly. As 
the observation in Wólka Kosowska showed, Chinese running their own smaller businesses notice and 
experience the competition and try to create more and more attractive conditions of trading operations. 
Nonetheless, they will put efforts in improving their economic situation through entrepreneurships or 
work in Poland as long as they see it profitable. Supposedly, Chinese operating in Wólka Kosowska 
will increase their dominance over other national groups, even if Chinese stay less numerous. 
However, their success is also dependent on the presence and entrepreneurial activities of other 
groups, including mostly Vietnamese.  
5. Conclusions  
Growing FDI activity of Chinese companies together with increase in Chinese international mobility 
raises important question about linkages between these two processes. In this paper we aimed at 
referring to this issue but it was clear that the answer is conditional on data availability (quality) and 
very nature of this process itself.  
Data suggests that while both FDI and migration from China to Poland is growing, it is still a 
phenomenon of relatively limited scale. Some past experiences suggest that there are some industries 
where FDI will continue to grow, perhaps fostering the migration processes as well. Such investment 
projects create jobs locally, partly for the Polish workers and from a perspective of a local community 
contribute significantly to the local economy. Case of Wolka Kosowska presented in this report 
(section 4.3) constitutes one of such examples. On the opposite case of COVEC shows that Chinese 
business strategies do not necessarily fit European reality and they can impact negatively both future 
capital and labour flows. 
On the other hand, a large proportion of the Chinese migrants to Poland work as ethnic 
entrepreneurs, occupied in either trading or gastronomy. While these inflows contribute to expanding 
ethnic diversity in Poland, they were not large enough to affect aggregate scale processes. Again case 
of Wolka Kosowska shows that presence of growing Chinese community can easily induce 
endogenous investment processes and lead to perpetuation of both Chinese investments and 
immigration. Due to extraordinary changes in migration dynamics observed in recent years Poland is 
thus to be perceived as a very attractive field to trace development of Chinese diaspora (and its 
impacts on business activities).  
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